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Abstract 
 
Previous application of value of information methods to optimal clinical trial design have 
predominantly taken a societal decision making perspective, implicitly assuming that health care 
costs are covered through public expenditure and trial research is funded by government or 
donation-based philanthropic agencies. In this paper, we consider the interaction between 
interrelated perspectives of a societal decision maker (e.g. NICE in the UK) charged with the 
responsibility for approving new health interventions for reimbursement and the company that 
holds the patent for a new intervention. We establish optimal decision making from societal and 
company perspectives, allowing for tradeoffs between the value and cost of research and the 
price of the new intervention. 
 
Given the current level of evidence, there exists a maximum (threshold) price acceptable to the 
decision maker. Submission for approval with prices above this threshold will be refused. Given 
the current level of evidence and the decision maker’s threshold price, there exists a minimum 
(threshold) price acceptable to the company. If the decision maker’s threshold price exceeds the 
company’s then current evidence is sufficient since any price between the thresholds is 
acceptable to both. On the other hand, if the decision maker’s threshold price is lower than the 
company’s then no price is acceptable to both and the company’s optimal strategy is to 
commission additional research. The methods are illustrated using a recent example from the 
literature. 
1. Introduction 
Recently, there has been much interest in using value of information methods to determine 
optimal sample size for randomized clinical trials[1-28]. Value of information methods are 
proposed as an alternative to traditional frequentist approaches based on tests of hypotheses and 
arbitrarily determined quantities, such as the type I and II error probabilities and the smallest 
clinically important difference. Using value of information methods, the sample size that 
maximizes the expected net gain can be determined, where the expected net gain is the difference 
between the expected value of the (sample) information provided by a trial and the expected total 
cost. If the maximum expected net gain is negative, decision making can be made based on 
current information, adopting the new intervention if, and only if, the expected incremental net 
benefit is positive. On the other hand, if the maximum expected net gain is positive then a trial is 
worthwhile, with the optimal sample size being that which maximizes the expected net gain. 
 
Taking a societal perspective, where health care costs are covered through public expenditure 
and trial research is funded by government or donation-based philanthropic agencies, Willan and 
Pinto[20] provide a solution under restrictive assumptions. Subsequent papers[6-9,23,24] provide 
solutions with the assumptions relaxed.  
 
Industry perspectives can also been taken. Gittins and Pezeshk[11,12], Kikuchi, Pezeshk and 
Gittins[16], Pezeshk and Gittins[17] and Pezeshk[18] use a decision theoretic approach to determine 
optimal sample size under the assumptions that the number of patients receiving the new 
intervention is a function of the observed size of the treatment effect and the associated statistical 
significance. Willan[22] provides a solution for optimal sample size from an industrial 
perspective, in which the value of the information from a new trial relates to the expected 
increase in the probability of regulatory approval and market share. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a value of information framework for exploring the 
interaction between the interrelated perspectives of a societal decision maker (e.g. NICE in the 
UK) and a company that submits evidence in support of a new intervention for the purposes of 
supporting the approval of the new intervention for reimbursement. As discussed by Eckermann 
and Willan[6,8] and Griffin et al.[29], approving a new intervention based solely on the criterion 
that the current estimated of incremental net benefit is positive ignores the uncertainty associated 
with the estimate. 
 
From a societal perspective it will be optimal to undertake further research if the expected value 
of information from such research exceeds the expected opportunity cost. Current evidence is 
sufficient (i.e., adopting now is optimal) only if for any potential research design the expected 
cost of research exceeds its expected value. Expected value of research falls as positive INB 
becomes more certain, or as the price of the new intervention is reduced. The expected 
opportunity cost of research increases as expected INB increases or as price reduces.   
Consequently, given the option for the decision maker to request additional research, our 
framework can be used to establish a stricter criterion for current evidence of incremental net 
benefit and price at which adopting is optimal, allowing for the uncertainty associated with 
current evidence.  
 
Assuming that the decision maker and the company are acting optimally and are risk neutral, the 
framework can also be used to establish the maximum (threshold) price acceptable to the 
decision maker and a minimum (threshold) price acceptable to the company.  
 
If the decision maker’s threshold price exceeds the company’s then the current evidence is 
sufficient for decision making since any price between the two thresholds is acceptable to both. 
On the other hand, if the company’s threshold price exceeds the decision maker’s then no price is 
acceptable to both and, as we subsequently demonstrate, the company’s optimal strategy is to 
collect additional evidence prior to submitting for approval. 
 
Consider the perspective of a societal decision maker who is charged with the responsibility of 
deciding whether or not to add a new intervention to the formulary for reimbursement at a given 
price. The decision maker can accept the new intervention, reject it outright or request additional 
research. To the decision maker, the value of additional research is the expected reduction in 
opportunity loss from making decisions in the face of uncertain incremental net benefit. 
However, assuming it is infeasible to accept the new intervention while research is undertaken, 
there is also an expected opportunity cost to the decision maker of delaying the decision, since 
denying the new intervention to patients until the evidence is updated forgoes expected 
incremental net benefit of the new intervention.  We show that as the price of the new 
intervention increases, the value of additional research increases, while the opportunity cost 
decreases. Consequently, there exists a threshold price for the societal decision maker, above 
which the expected value of sample information from additional evidence exceeds its expected 
cost, i.e. the expected net gain from additional evidence is positive. 
 
The other perspective to consider is that of the company requesting that the intervention be 
added to the formulary for reimbursement. The company incurs a financial cost of conducting 
further research and an opportunity cost from revenue foregone while the research is conducted. 
The value of additional research, from a company perspective, relates to expected increase in the 
decision maker’s threshold price associated with a reduction in uncertainty and, as we 
subsequently show, decreases as the price increases. We also show that as the price increases, the 
cost in foregone revenue increases. Hence, as the price of the intervention increases over the 
range for which expected net benefit is positive, the expected net gain of additional evidence 
from the company’s perspective decreases due to both increasing cost and falling value. 
Therefore, for the company, there exists a threshold price below which the value of new 
evidence exceeds its cost, i.e. the expected net gain is positive, making additional research 
worthwhile. 
 
If the company’s maximum (with respect to research design) expected net gain is positive with 
the price set at the decision maker’s threshold (or, equivalently, if the company’s threshold price 
exceeds that of the decision maker) then a further research is optimal from the company’s 
perspective. That is, where there is positive expected net gain of further research for the 
company with the price set low enough to be acceptable to the decision maker, no common price 
exists at which both parties would prefer to add the intervention to the formulary. Conversely, if 
the company’s maximum expected net gain is negative with the price set to the decision maker’s 
threshold price then it will be optimal to submit a proposal for approval at the decision maker’s 
threshold price rather than commission further research. 
 
Methods for establishing the societal decision maker’s and the company’s threshold prices, given 
current evidence and expected actions and allowing for their interaction, are provided in Section 
2  and illustrated in Section 3 with an example taken from a recent publication. Extensions to the 
model to account for partial revenue per patient, discounting and cost of adopting the new 
intervention are established in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses implications of the findings for 
pricing and reimbursement in processes of health technology assessment within a jurisdiction. 
Further research on optimal solutions across jurisdictions and the importance of appropriate 
threshold value for health outcomes in the determination of incremental net benefit are also 
discussed.    
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Incremental net benefit and expected value of information 
Consider the cost-effectiveness assessment of a new health care intervention, referred to as 
Treatment (T), versus the appropriate comparator, referred to as Standard (S).  Let eji, j = T, S be 
the (clinical) effectiveness for patient i receiving intervention j and let jic , j = T, S be the total 
health care cost for patient i receiving intervention j. The cost Tic  includes the price of the new 
intervention for patients receiving Treatment.  Let E( )j jie e= , E( )j jic c= , e T Se e∆ = −  and 
c T Sc c∆ = − , where E( )⋅  is the expected value function. If λ is the decision maker’s threshold 
value for a unit of effectiveness, then e cb ≡ ∆ λ −∆  is the incremental net benefit. Now, if we 
separate out the price of the new intervention from other costs in the notation we can explore the 
consequences of allowing it to vary. If the per-patient price of the new intervention (i.e. revenue 
per patient to the company) equals R, then Ti Tic c R
− ≡ −  is the health care cost for patient i 
receiving Treatment, excluding the price of the new intervention, where price is assumed to be 
the same for all patients. Further, let T Tc c R
− = − , c c R
−∆ = ∆ −  and e cb
− −= ∆ λ −∆ . We assume 
that the decision maker’s threshold value is known to the company. 
 
Suppose that a societal decision maker is charged with the task of deciding whether or not to 
approve a submission from a company to have the new intervention added to the formulary for 
reimbursement at a price of R. The current evidence in support of the new intervention, relative 
to the appropriate comparator, is expressed as a normal probability distribution function for the 
incremental net benefit, with mean b0 and variance v0. That is, 0 0 0= ∆ λ −∆e cb  and 
2
0 0 0 02 ,= λ + − λe c ecv v v c where, based on current evidence, 0∆e  and 0∆c  are the means and 0ev  
and 0cv  the variance of ∆e  and ,∆c  respectively, and 0ecc  is the covariance between ∆e  and .∆c  
Let 0 0 .
− = +b b R  The assumption of normality is applied to incremental net benefit and not to the 
individual patient observations, as illustrated in the Section 3 example, where binomial and 
gamma models are assumed for effectiveness and cost, respectively. If 0 0b ≤ , it is optimal for 
the decision maker to refuse approval or request a price reduction. If b0 > 0, potentially optimal 
decisions are to approve reimbursement, request a price reduction prior to approval, or request 
additional research. 
 
Assuming that the additional evidence is from a randomized clinical trial in which the cost and 
effectiveness are observed on n patients per arm (Treatment and Standard), the expected value of 
sample information (EVSId) of the trial to the societal decision maker is given by Willan and 
Pinto[20] and Eckermann and Willan[7] as 
{ }EVSI ( ) ( ) ( )d n N n n= −D F , 
where 
( )N n  is the number of patients to whom the decision applies; 
( )20 0 0 0 0 0 0(2 ) exp (2 ) ( ) 0v b v b b v I b  = π − − Φ − − ≤   D ; 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )




0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0
( ) (2 ) exp 2 ( )
exp 2 2
exp (2 ) 2 ;
n v b v nv
b b v v b v v
b b v v v b v v v
+= π σ −
− Φ − + − π
+ Φ − − − π
F
 
2 V( ) V( )Ti Ti Si Sie c e c+σ = λ − + λ −  is the sum over treatment groups of the between-patient 
variance of net benefit; 
2
0v v n+= + σ ; 
( )Φ ⋅  is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal random variable; and 
( )I ⋅  is the indicator function. 
The terms D  and ( )nF  are the pre- and post-trial per-patient expected opportunity loss, 
respectively. Their difference is the amount by which the per-patient expected opportunity loss is 
reduced by the trial evidence and, when multiplied by the number of patients who can benefit, 
yields the expected value of sample information. Where 0 0,>b  the difference ( ),− nD F  which 
is the per-patient expected value of sample information (EVSIpp(n)), simplifies to 
( ) ( )2 2pp 0 0 0 0 0 0EVSI ( ) exp (2 ) 2 .= − π − Φ −n v b v v v b b v v  
 
If h, expressed in years, is the time horizon for the new intervention, k the annual incidence of 
the health condition in question, a the annual patient accrual rate and τ, expressed in years, the 
duration from when the last patient is recruited until the evidence is updated, then, as given in 
Eckermann and Willan[7], the number of patients to whom the decision applies is given by 
{ }( ) ( 2 ) .= − τ+N n h n a k  
 
If the trial is undertaken by the company, the only cost to the decision maker is the expected 
opportunity cost (EOCd) incurred by those patients who are denied the intervention while the 
trial is performed and the evidence is updated, given by Eckermann and Willan[7] as 
{ } 0EOC ( ) ( 2 )d n n a k n b= τ+ − . 
 
Therefore, the expected net gain (ENGd) to the decision maker of another trial of n patients per 
arm, defined as EVSId – EOCd, is given by 
{ } { } { } 0ENG ( ) ( 2 ) ( ) ( 2 )d n h n a k n n a k n b= − τ+ − − τ+ −D F .  (1) 
 
Let ENG ( )d n  be maximized at *Rn . If 
*ENG ( )d Rn  is positive then the optimal decision is to 
delay approval and request another trial with *Rn  patients per arm. On the other hand, if 
*ENG ( )d Rn  is negative then, if b0 is positive, the optimal decision is to approve the intervention 
for reimbursement at a price of R. The subscript R in the notation for optimal sample size is a 
reminder that the optimal sample size depends on the submitted price.  
 
Griffin et al.[29] provide a criterion similar to Equation 1 for choosing between adoption and 
rejection which allows for uncertainty as to whether or not additional research will be conducted. 
However, they use the current expected value of perfect information (EVPI), rather than the 
expected value of sample information, as the value of additional research. EVPI does not allow 
for optimal decision making, since it overestimates value of research and has no defined 
relationship to EVSI, let alone ENG which is required f optimal decision making. Hence, 
Eckermann, Karnon and Willan (2010) show that use of EVPI in prioritizing research can easily 
lead to support for research with negative ENG, while also failing to support research with high 
research return despite small EVPI.   
 
2.2. Decision maker’s threshold price 
By substituting 0b R
− −  for 0b , where 0 0>b , the expected net gain can be seen as a function of n 
and R, given as 
{ } { }pp 0
ENG ( , ) EVSI ( , ) EOC ( , )
( 2 ) EVSI ( , ) ( 2 ) ( ) ,−
= −
= − τ+ − τ+ − −
d d dn R n R n R
h n a k n R n a k n b R
        (2) 
where 
( ) ( )2 2pp 0 0 0 0 0 0EVSI ( , ) exp ( ) (2 ) 2 ( ) ( ) .− − −= − − π − − Φ − −n R v b R v v v b R b R v v  
 
Since, if all other variables are held constant, the EVSId is an increasing function of R and EOCd 
is a decreasing function of R, there exists a decision maker’s threshold price, denoted 0
dR , such 
that if 0
dR R<  , *ENG ( )d Rn  is negative, while if 0
dR R>  , *ENG ( )d Rn  is positive. Therefore, if 
0
dR R≤  , the expected net gain for another trial is negative, regardless of its size, and the optimal 
decision for the decision maker is to approve the intervention for reimbursement at a price of R.  
On the other hand, if 0
dR R>  , the optimal decision is to request evidence from another trial, with 
*




dR  is the maximum price acceptable to the decision maker then 0 0 0
−= −d db b R  is the 
minimum acceptable incremental net benefit, referred to as the threshold incremental net benefit. 
Therefore, because of the uncertainty, the criterion for adoption should be 0 0>
db b  rather than 
0 0,>b  where 0b  is the estimate of incremental net benefit based on some price R, 
0 0. . .
−= −i e b b R  Note that 0 0>
db b  is equivalent to 0 .<
dR R  
 
2.3. Company’s threshold Price  
The maximum price the company can receive following a trial of m patients per arm is dmR , the 
post-trial threshold price for the decision maker. Therefore, for a company facing a price of R, 
the expected value of the sample information is the increase in the post-trial revenue per patient, 
given by 
{ } { }EVSI ( , ) ( 2 ) E( )c dmm R h m a k R R= − τ+ − , 
which is simply the post-trial time horizon multiplied by the incidence and the expected increase 
in price. All other variables constant, EVSI ( , )c m R  is a decreasing function of R. 
 
The financial cost to the company of performing a trial with m patients per arm is given by 
2f vC mC+ , where Cf  is the fixed cost and Cv the per-patient variable cost of performing the 
trial. The expected opportunity cost of foregone revenue experience by the company, facing a 
price of R, is given by ( 2 )m a kRτ + , which is simply the duration of the trial multiplied by the 
incidence and the price. Therefore, the expected total cost for the company (ETCc) is given by 
ETC ( , ) 2 ( 2 )c f vm R C mC m a kR= + + τ+ . 
All other variables held constant, ETC ( , )c m R  is an increasing function of R. The expected net 
gain to the company (ENGc) of a trial with m patients per arm is given by 
{ } { } { }
{ }
ENG ( , ) EVSI ( , ) ETC ( , )
( 2 ) E( ) 2 ( 2 )






m R m R m R
h m a k R R C mC m a kR
h m a k R hkR C mC
= −
= − τ+ − − + + τ+





Let ENG ( , )c m R  be maximized at *Rm . Since 
*EVSI ( , )c Rm R  is a decreasing function of R and 
*ETC ( , )c Rm R  is a increasing function of R, there exists a company threshold price, denoted 0
cR , 
such that if 0
cR R<  , *ENG ( , )c Rm R  is positive, while if 0
cR R>  , *ENG ( , )c Rm R  is negative. The 
threshold price can be determined by setting *ENG ( , ) 0c Rm R =  and solving for R, yielding 
{ } ** *
0
( 2 ) E( ) ( 2 )
R
d
R f R vmc
h m a k R C m C
R
hk




The threshold price 0
cR  depends on R, the price the company faces, and, substituting the 
maximum pre-trial price the company faces, i.e. 0







( 2 ) E( ) ( 2 )d d
dR
d
f vR m R
c
h m a k R C m C
R
hk





 .   (3) 
If the decision maker’s threshold price is greater than the company’s, i.e. 0 0
d cR R>  , the maximum 
expected net gain for another trial is negative and the optimal decision for the company is to 
submit for approval at an expected price of 0
dR .  On the other hand, if 0 0
d cR R<  , the maximum 
expected net gain for another trial is positive and the optimal decision for the company is to 
perform another trial with a sample size of 
0
*







when the evidence is updated. 
 
3. Example—The Cadet-Hp Trial 
The CADET-Hp Trial was a double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group, multi-centre, 
randomized controlled trial performed in 36 family practitioner centres across Canada. The 
results are published in Chiba et al.[30,31] and Willan[32]. Patients 18 years and over with 
uninvestigated dyspepsia of at least moderate severity presenting to their family physicians were 
eligible for randomization, provided they did not have any alarm symptoms and were eligible for 
empiric drug therapy. Patients were randomized between 
 T: Omeprazole 20 mg, metronidazole 500 mg and clarithromycin 250 mg; and 
 S: Omeprazole 20 mg, placebo metronidazole and placebo clarithromycin. 
 
A total of 288 patients were randomized, 142 (= nT) to Treatment and 146 (= nS) to Standard. 
The new intervention (i.e. Treatment) is the regimen of metronidazole 500 mg and 
clarithromycin 250 mg. Both regimens were given twice daily for seven days. The binary 
measure of effectiveness was treatment success, defined as the presence of no or minimal 
dyspepsia symptoms at one year. Costs were determined from the societal perspective and are 
given in Canadian dollars. A summary of the trial results are given in Table I.   
 
Treatment was observed to increase the probability of treatment success by 13.71 percentage 
points and reduce total cost by $75.30 per patient, excluding the price of metronidazole and 
clarithromycin. If we assume a normal flat prior for incremental net benefit, and assume that the 
estimator of incremental net benefit from this trial is normally distributed then the current 
evidence in favour of Treatment will be based solely on the data from this trial, and will be 
characterized by a normal distribution for incremental net benefit with mean 
0
ˆ ˆ( ) 0.1371 ( 75.30 ) 0.1371 75.30e cb R R R




ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 2 ( , ) 0.003356 4320 2 ( 0.6870)e c e cv V V C
− −= ∆ λ + ∆ − λ ∆ ∆ = λ + − λ − , 
where λ is the threshold value for the willingness-to-pay for a treatment success. Assume a time 
horizon (h) of 10 years, an annual incidence (k) of 80,000, an annual accrual rate (a) of 800 and a 
duration of 1.5 years for follow-up and data analysis (τ). A plot of the decision maker’s threshold 
price 0( )
dR  as a function of the threshold value of a treatment success (λ) is given in Figure 1. 
The quantity 0
dR  is the maximum price at which the decision maker would approve now in 
preference to requesting another trial, and increases with the threshold value for a treatment 
success. Also given in Figure 1 is the plot of the threshold incremental net benefit, i.e. 
0 0 0 .
−= −d db b R  For λ = 500, the threshold decision maker’s price is $106.53, and the threshold 
incremental net benefit is $37.32. Thus the decision maker would approve for reimbursement if 
the submitted price is less than $106.53 or, equivalently, if the mean incremental net benefit is 
greater than $37.32.  
 
A plot of the decision maker’s optimal sample size *( )Rn=  as a function of price (R) is given in 
Figure 2 for λ = 500.  At a price less than or equal to $106.53 0( )
dR=  , Treatment would be 
approved for reimbursement, see Figure 1. At the other end of the scale, if the price exceeds 
$143.85, approval would be refused since mean incremental net benefit (b0) would be negative. 
For a price between $106.53 and $143.85 the decision maker would request another trial, with 
the size of the trial increasing with R over this range, as the incremental net benefit falls towards 
zero at R = $143.85. For example, at a submitted price of $140.67, the decision maker would 
request a trial of 387 patients per arm. Given the societal decision maker’s threshold price with 
current evidence, the company’s optimal behaviour is to submit a request with the price set to 
$106.53 0( )
dR=  , unless there exists a sample size such that their expected net gain (ENGc) is 
positive.   
 
For λ = 500 and fixed (Cf) and variable (Cv) cost of $800,000 and $2000 respectively, Table II 
contains, from the company’s perspective, the expected value of sample information (EVSIc), the 
total cost (TCc) and the expected net gain (ENGc) for various sample sizes. Also given in Table 
II is the post-trial expected threshold price for the decision maker ( )E( )dmR , which was 
determined by numerical integration, see the Appendix. The optimal sample size lies between 
100 and 200 patients per arm. A more exhaustive search reveals that the optimal sample size is 
137 patients per arm, corresponding to a pre-trial threshold price to the company 0( )
cR  of 
$113.06 and an expected net gain to the company of $6,451,162.  The expected threshold price 
for the decision maker following a trial of 137 patients per arm ( )137E( )dR  is $140.67. By 
contrast, a pre-trial submission by the company at a price of $140.67 would precipitate a request 
from the decision maker for a trial with 387 patients per arm, see Figure 2, which is associated 
with an expected net gain to the company of only $1,170,179, see Table II. 
 
4. Extensions 
4.1. Partial revenue per patient 
In Sections 2 and 3, it was assumed that the revenue per patient received by the company is equal 
to the price. It is more realistic to assume that the revenue per patient to the company is, instead, 
a fraction, U, of the price, in which case the expected net gain and the threshold price to the 
company become: 






( 2 * ) E( ) ( 2 )d d
dR
d
f vR m R
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h m a k R U C m C
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hk








In Sections 2, 3 and 4.1 above, a discount rate of zero is assumed. A discount rate of r > 0 
requires the following adjustments to the formulations for the expected net gain for the decision 
maker and company (ENGd and ENGc respectively) and threshold price to the company 0( )
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** 2 dRt m a= + τ  is the optimal trial duration; *
Lt  is the integer part of t*; 
* * 1U Lt t= + ;
0
** 2 da Rt m a=   is the duration of patient accrual; and 
*L




4.3 Positive cost of adoption 
In Sections 2, 3, 4.1 and 4.2 above, the cost of adopting the new intervention is assumed to be 
zero. Let CA be the cost of adopting Treatment. It is reasonable to assume that the adoption of a 
new health care intervention will incur some up-front costs, such as those associated with 
conveying public health messages, training and learning by doing as well as capital equipment. 
For a positive CA, it can be shown that the formulations for ( )RD , ( , )n RF  and EOC ( )d n  
become:  
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5. Discussion 
Previous application of value of information methods to optimal trial design have predominantly 
taken a societal decision making perspective, implicitly assuming that society commissions 
prospective trials and decides whether or not to adopt new health interventions. Eckermann and 
Willan[6-9] demonstrate that optimal societal decision making and trial design requires joint 
consideration of whether to commission another trial or adopt the new intervention, given that 
the value, cost and feasibility of performing another trial are determined by whether or not the 
new intervention is adopted. Optimal decision making is shown to require a comparison of 
expected net gain for delaying the decision regarding adoption and performing another trial 
versus adopting immediately with no trial within jurisdiction, with the additional consideration 
of expected net gain for adopting and trialing, where feasible, across jurisdictions. 
 
Griffin, Claxton and Sculpher[29] suggest that, where societal decision making is restricted to 
adopting or rejecting, the decision could influence manufacturers through a tradeoff between the 
price of, and level of evidence for, a new intervention. The tradeoff they suggest is between 
expected value of perfect information and incremental net benefit, where expected value of 
perfect information is suggested as the opportunity cost of adopting and incremental net benefit 
the opportunity cost of delaying. However, the populations to which the value of information and 
the opportunity costs apply are different. Value of information (the option value of delay) arises 
for all patients beyond the point that evidence is updated, while an opportunity cost of 
incremental net benefit arises for all patients except those on the treatment arm of the trial, until 
evidence is updated[6-8]. Consequently, a tradeoff between value of information and opportunity 
cost needs to consider time and population differences. Further, value of information from 
delaying should be the expected value of sample information of an optimal trial, rather than 
expected value of perfect information, given evidence. The expected opportunity loss of adoption 
is the expected value of sample information provide by an optimal trial, not the expected value of 
perfect information. Griffin et al.[29] extend their methods to account for changing populations 
and consider the role of additional research. However, they still quantify the value of additional 
research as the expected value of perfect information, rather than the expected value of sample 
information as required by optimal decision making, which we have addressed as part of this 
paper. 
 
In this paper we have established and illustrated the appropriate tradeoff between pricing and the 
level of evidence relevant to the societal decision of whether to approve health care interventions 
for reimbursement when companies have sole remit to commission trials. For a given level of 
evidence, it has been illustrated that there exists a maximum threshold price “acceptable” to the 
societal decision maker. For prices above this threshold, the expected net gain for the decision 
maker from another trial is positive and requesting another trial is their optimal strategy.  
 
Further, we have shown that the optimal response of manufacturers to the societal threshold price 
of whether to undertake further research or lower their price depends on their expected value and 
cost of research and current evidence. Given current evidence, there exists a minimum threshold 
price “acceptable” to the company, meaning that for prices below the threshold, the expected net 
gain for the company from another trial is positive and performing another trial is their optimal 
strategy. The company’s threshold price exceeds that of the decision maker if, and only if, there 
exists a sample size for which the company’s expected net gain is positive.  
 
The optimal strategy for a company is to submit for approval at the decision maker’s threshold 
price when the company’s expected net gain is negative for all sample sizes at this price, or to 
perform another trial when the maximum expected net gain for the company is positive. From 
the company perspective, the optimal sample size of the trial will be that which maximizes their 
expected net gain, given the value and cost of trials and revenue foregone. In general, it is sub-
optimal for the company to submit for approval at a price greater than the decision maker’s 
threshold, since, at best, it will precipitate a request for another trial with, from their perspective, 
sub-optimal sample size.  
 
Thus, the incentives implicit in the framework presented here discourage the company from 
submitting for approval until there is sufficient evidence to support the submitted price. This 
reduces administrative and analytic burden on decision makers and companies alike, in turn 
reducing the associated transaction costs of the approval process. Other considerations, such as 
the value of being the first to market, the competing uses of research funding, or uncertainty in 
relation to the threshold value of outcomes in a jurisdiction may also influence the expected 
revenue and cost of research trade-off faced by companies in undertaking decision making.  
Hence, the framework presented here could be generalized to account for these additional factors 
where appropriate. Nevertheless, in general, the framework enables optimal tradeoffs between 
the value and cost of further research from both societal and company perspectives and 
establishes how these tradeoffs interact and play out in practice, where companies have control 
of prospective research and society has control of reimbursement within a jurisdiction.   
 
The analysis presented has been strictly within jurisdiction. Moving beyond a strictly within 
jurisdiction analysis, options arise in relation to adopting and trialing, with the associated 
advantages in avoiding opportunity cost of delay, and the potential for improving risk sharing 
arrangements between companies and societal decision makers[9,10]. Hence, further research is 
suggested to extend the within jurisdiction framework presented here and explore optimal 
mechanisms for researching and pricing across jurisdictions, given interactions between decision 
makers and manufacturers and the potential to adopt and trial. This could, for example, consider 
incorporating contractual agreements to adjust pricing in jurisdictions where such adoption is 
optimal while additional evidence is collected in other jurisdictions in which delaying and 
trialing is optimal.  
 
To apply a framework for optimal decision making and interaction between societal decision 
makers and companies, within or across jurisdictions, it is critical to establish economically and 
meaningful societal threshold values for health outcomes. Threshold values are required to 
determine the prior distribution of incremental net benefit, the expected value of sample 
information and opportunity cost, as well as the consequent threshold prices and optimal research 
decisions. There is wide agreement that the threshold value for health outcomes in societal 
decision making should reflect the opportunity cost of funding new interventions within a fixed 
budget and the current use of existing interventions. Recently, it has been suggested that, if the 
societal objective is restricted to health maximisation, the threshold value for outcomes can be 
estimated as the shadow price of the least cost-effective (worst performing) interventions to be 
displaced[33,34-36]. However, even if the objective is restricted to health maximization, the shadow 
price of contracting or displacing the least cost-effective interventions will only coincide with 
that from the best expansion of current interventions (represented by the opportunity cost from 
financing new interventions) when there is complete allocative efficiency across all activities and 
interventions[37,38].  Hence, with allocative inefficiency in the current health care system, the 
opportunity cost and threshold price of, e.g., incremental dollars per QALY gained will be lower 
than that of displacing the least cost effective services. Consequently, evidence of the most cost 
effective expansion of existing technology is required to estimate the true opportunity cost and 
threshold values for incremental net benefit so that value of information methods can be 
appropriately applied. 
 
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the parameters h, k, a and τ are fixed, mostly to 
focus the attention on the uncertainty regarding incremental net benefit. However, the 
uncertainty of such parameters could be added to the model. The parameters h, a and τ would be 
amenable to sensitivity analyses, since they are somewhat in the control of the investigators. On 
the other hand, the uncertainty regarding k might be best incorporated by using a Bayesian 
approach since its estimate would be typically based on empirical evidence. We have assumed 
that the prior- and post-study distributions for incremental net benefit are derived from 
randomized clinical trials data. However, it is often the case, as in decision-analytic models, for 
example, that incremental net benefit is a complex function of many parameters, the information 
for which may come from a variety of study types, see Ades, Lu and Claxton[1]. This is 
illustrated in Welton et al.[19] who examine the evidence in support of interventions for 
improving the uptake of breast cancer screening, and by Brennan and Kharroubi[39] who explore 
methods for EVSI determination for models with Weibull survival parameters. Consequently 
value is suggested to extending the methods presented in this paper for randomized clinical trials 
to other research designs. Nonetheless, the principle of applying value of information methods 
for the pricing of new health interventions illustrated in this paper is the same, regardless of the 
derivation of incremental net benefit. 
 
The case for assuming normality for mean incremental net benefit based on individual patient 
data has been made by numerous authors, and has been generally accepted. The parametric 
assumption of bivariate normality for mean cost and effectiveness (and hence, mean incremental 
net benefit) has been shown to perform well[40-43]. Alternative distributional assumptions for 
incremental net benefit do not, in general, lead to closed form solutions for the expected value of 
sample information, requiring the use of numerical integration or Markov Chain-Monte Carlo 
methods. Consequently, the computer intensiveness of methods required with alternative 
assumptions may prove to be particularly challenging[1]. 
 
We have assumed that the company is risk-neutral, implying that if the company’s threshold 
price exceeds the decision maker’s then it is optimal for the company to do additional research. 
However, if the company is somewhat risk-averse then they should be more willing at the margin 
to accept the decision maker’s threshold price based on current evidence.  Hence, while expected 
revenue associated with an expected increase in the decision maker’s threshold price with 
additional evidence may be greater than the companies direct and opportunity costs, the risk-
averse company may not be willing to risk that actual net revenue could be reduced due to a 
potential price reduction with additional evidence. 
Appendix 
d
mR  is the decision maker’s threshold price following a trial of m patients per arm. That is, 
d
mR  is 
that value of R, such that max {ENG ( , )} 0,=n m n R  where ENG ( , )m n R  is the expected net gain 
of performing a trial of n patients per arm, once the evidence is updated with data from the trial 
of m patients per arm. Numerical integration with respect to the distribution f is used to 
determine the expected value of ,dmR  where f is the pdf for the observed incremental net benefit 
from the trial of m patients per arm, which, under the assumptions we have made, is normal with 
mean b0 and variance 20 .+= + σv v m  
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Table I.  Parameter estimates for the CADET-Hp Trial 
 Treatment Standard   
Sample size ( )jn=  142 146  
Proportion of successes 
ˆ( )je=  0.507 0.3699 
difference = 0.1371 ˆ( )e= ∆  
Estimate of mean cost 
minus cost of 
metronidazole and 
clarithromycin 
(using gamma model) 
459.50 534.80 difference = -75.30 ˆ( )c
−= ∆  
Estimated variance of 
proportion of successes 
ˆ ˆ( (1 ) )j j je e n= −  
0.00176 0.001596 sum = 0.003356 ˆ ˆ( ( ))eV= ∆  
Estimated variance of 
average cost 
(using gamma model) 
1,825 2,495 sum = 4,320 ˆ ˆ( ( ))cV
−= ∆  
Estimated covariance 
between proportion of 
successes and average cost 
(using gamma model) 
-0.2837 -0.4033 sum = -0.6870 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( , ))e cC
−= ∆ ∆  
note: θ̂  is an estimate of θ 
 
 
Table II.  From the company’s perspective, the expected value of sample information 
(EVSIc), total cost (TCc), expected net gain (ENGc) and the decision maker’s expected 
threshold price ( E( )dmR ) as a function of sample size, for the CADET-Hp Trial 
Sample Size 
Per Arm (m) EVSI
c TCc ENGc E( )dmR  
50 18,252,845 14,650,000 3,602,845 132.24 
100 20,539,382 15,900,000 4,639,382 136.12 
137§ 23,276,162 16,825,000 6,451,162 140.67 
150 22,530,291 17,150,000 5,380,291 139.66 
200 24,796,479 18,400,000 6,396,479 143.74 
250 23,679,076 19,650,000 4,029,076 142.59 
300 24,283,713 20,900,000 3,383,713 144.17 
350 23,325,027 22,150,000 1,175,027 143.24 
387§§ 24,245,179 23,075,000 1,170,179 145.23 
400 24,126,392 23,400,000 726,392 145.21 
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Figure 1.  The decision maker’s threshold price 0( )
dR  and threshold mean incremental net 
benefit 0 0 0( )
−= −d db b R  as a function of the threshold value for treatment success (λ), for the 
CADET-Hp Trial. At a threshold value for treatment success of $500, the decision maker’s 












100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150
Figure 2.  Optimal sample size *( )Rn  as a function of price (R) for a threshold value 
for treatment success (λ) of 500. The decision maker approves for R < 106.53; refuses 
approval for R > 143.85; and, requests another trial for 106.53 143.85.R≤ ≤  
387
143.85 R
*
Rn
395
245
106.53 140.67
